Abstract: This essay traces the literary development of David Hume's moral philosophy in terms of an unresolved (perhaps unresolvable) conflict between two styles: the straightforward, unemotional style which Hume calls "anatomy" and the emotionally evocative style which he calls "painting." Hume's literary struggles were symptomatic of the conflicting obligations placed on authors in the print culture of Enlightenment Britain. Eighteenth-century authors were believed to have a responsibility to inform their readers, to provide them with clear, accurate insights on important topics. Authors, however, were also believed to have a responsibility to connect with their readers emotionally so as to allow for the creation of the sort of sentimental community so highly valued at the time. Only if such a union of hearts as well as minds was established successfully could printed texts evoke proper moral sentiments and hence become vehicles for both ethical improvement and social reform. While Hume began with a pure commitment to the anatomical approach, both he and his contemporaries quickly came to see this as an unacceptable literary practice. Hume thus began a series of attempts to combine both painting and anatomy in a single text, none of which proved entirely successful. While many commentators have been dissatisfied with either the lack of authentic emotion in Hume's earliest work or with the lack of philosophical depth in his latter publications (or both), these problems must be understood in light of Hume's continual efforts to meet the multiple, conflicting imperatives of Enlightenment print culture. This essay will focus on Hume's struggle between two modes of moral-philosophical composition prevalent in his day: the cold, unemotional style associated with experimental science that Hume metaphorically labels "anatomy" and the warm, rhetorical style which he labels "painting."
When David Hume wrote the Baron de Montesquieu "J'ai consacré ma vie à la philosophie et aux belles-lettres,"
1 he was not describing himself as having two separate callings.
His was a single vocation-one involving the expression of deep thought through beautiful writing. 2 This vocation did not come naturally or easily to Hume. He struggled continually to reshape his approach to prose, famously renouncing the Treatise of Human Nature as a literary failure and radically revising the presentation of his philosophy in the Essays and two Enquiries.
This essay will focus on Hume's struggle between two modes of moral-philosophical composition prevalent in his day: the cold, unemotional style associated with experimental science that Hume metaphorically labels "anatomy" and the warm, rhetorical style which he labels "painting."
Hume's literary development over the course of his repeated presentations of his moralphilosophical ideas has already been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. For many years, the conventional wisdom was that enshrined by L. A. Selby-Bigge in the editor's introduction to his edition of the Enquiries. The tale told by Selby-Bigge is one of stylistic progress but intellectual decline. While the Treatise is "ill-proportioned, incoherent [and] illexpressed," the Enquiries display "elegance, lucidity and proporition." 3 Yet while the Treatise is a philosophical masterpiece despite its literary flaws, in the Enquiries Hume has come to write works of a "lower philosophical standard" meant for an elegant but unsophisticated lay audience. 4 Yet just as Bigge's editions came eventually came to give way to new editions of Hume's writings, so too has his position on Hume's philosophical decline given way to new, positive evaluations of the Essays and Enquiries as remarkable philosophical works in their own right. 5 As so often happens, the counter-orthodoxy has become the orthodoxy, and there is now an air of mustiness to any philosophical dissatisfaction with Hume's later work, perhaps something unscholarly about refusing to accede to Hume's own judgment that of all his writings the second Enquiry was "incomparably the best." 6 Even if I am speaking only for myself, however, I must admit that at least some admirers of Hume's thought still experience considerable disappointment with both the literary style of the Treatise and the philosophical depth of the Essays and Enquiries, finding it unfortunate that Hume was never able to express his best ideas using his best prose. The goal of this essay is not to defend my lukewarm evaluation of these works, but to explain the tensions in the literary culture of his day which led Hume to write as he did, tensions which may in turn then help explain why so many over the centuries have found Hume's stylistic choices to be so deeply problematic.
The key to understanding Hume's literary development is to see that his struggle regarding painting and anatomy was not a solitary or idiosyncratic one. It was instead symptomatic of the conflicting obligations created by the relationship between authors and their readers in the print culture of Enlightenment Britain. Enlightenment authors were believed to have a responsibility to inform their readers, to provide them with accurate information on important topics. Doing so would suggest the adoption of an anatomical style. Yet these authors 4 Ibid., p. xiv. were also believed to have a responsibility to engage their readers-not only to hold their interest as a necessary prerequisite for the transfer of knowledge, but also to connect with them emotionally so as to allow for the creation of the sort of sentimental community so highly valued in the eighteenth century. Only if authors succeeded in affectively connecting with the readers could texts hope to change hearts as well as minds, evoking proper moral sentiments and hence become vehicles for both ethical improvement and social reform. As a result, while Hume began with a more or less straightforward commitment to the anatomical approach, he came over time to attempt to combine both painting and anatomy in a single text. Doing so, he became convinced, was necessary in order to emotionally engage a wide readership while maintaining philosophical depth and accuracy. It is not clear, however, whether painting and anatomy can actually be combined in the way that Hume wished to combine them. As a result, the tensions between anatomy and painting continued to plague Hume's philosophical composition. The conflicting demands placed on eighteenth century authors may never have been resolved adequately in his work.
Adam Potkay attributes the rise of a cold style of philosophical prose to the emergence of natural science, which in the minds of most eighteenth-century Britons had reached its apogee with Newton. The Royal Society and other institutional advocates of science in early modern
Britain promoted an "experimental ideal" according to which "procedural rigor and a transparent language of argumentation should supplant the deceptions of eloquence in all essays addressed to the understanding." 7 Perhaps the most notable statement of this position is by John Locke:
If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats. And therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided, and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.
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At the same time as this dry style was emerging in the work of philosophers inspired by Newtonian science, however, emotional rhetoric remained highly popular. Peter Jones describes the preachers and teachers of Enlightenment Britain as showing a strong "bias towards practical eloquence rather than mere learning." 9 The warm rhetoric of the pulpit and lectern found itself competing with cold empiricism of the laboratory for the loyalties of the British intelligentsia.
Enlightenment philosophers' divided allegiances have led historians to debate whose side they were really on. Jones, Nicholas Phillipson and others emphasize the didactic side of the moral philosophy of the British Enlightenment, while P. B. Wood has criticized this emphasis to focus on its naturalistic, empiricist side. What the former camp sees as the development of an art of secularized preaching, the latter camp sees as the development of a science of human nature explicitly modeled on the natural sciences. 10 The obvious resolution to this debate is that both sides are correct. While some British Enlightenment philosophers were preacherly moralists, others were quasi-scientific investigators of morality. Still others had conflicted loyalties, trying to negotiate a third way between the two camps. Hume's corpus offers an excellent case study of precisely such an attempt at literary triangulation. 12 Hume insists that his lack of warmth "has not happened by chance, but is the effect of a reasoning either good or bad." His reasoning is as follows:
There are different ways of examining the mind as well as the body. One may consider it either as an anatomist or as a painter: either to discover its most secret springs and principles or to describe the grace and beauty of its actions. I imagine it impossible to conjoin these two views. Where you pull off the skin and display all the minute parts, there appears something trivial even in the noblest attitudes and most vigorous actions.
Nor can you ever render the object graceful or engaging but by clothing the parts again with skin and flesh and presenting only their bare outside. An anatomist, however, can give very good advice to a painter or statuary, and in like manner I am persuaded that a metaphysician may be very helpful to a moralist, though I cannot easily conceive these two characters united in the same work. Any warm sentiment of morals, I am afraid, would have the air of declamation amidst abstract reasonings, and would be esteemed contrary to good taste. And though I am much more ambitious of being esteemed a friend to virtue than a writer of taste, yet I must always carry the latter in my eye, otherwise I must despair of ever being serviceable to virtue. I hope these reasons will satisfy you, though at the same time, I intend to make a new trial, if it be possible to make the moralist and metaphysician agree a little better.
13
Neither Hutcheson's initial criticisms nor his response to Hume survive. A letter from the following year, however, finds Hume informing his mentor that he has "been very busy in correcting and finishing that discourse concerning morals which you perused." Hume sent
Hutcheson the revised version of the conclusion to Book III as evidence. 14 This revised conclusion may be the "new trial" of which Hume wrote earlier. Sure enough, in the published version of that conclusion, Hume repeats the analogical reasoning he already used in his correspondence. Here, he writes:
12 "Heat," Potkay observes, "fairly pervades earlier eighteenth-century discussions of eloquence" (Potkay, op. cit., p. 26). 13 Letter 13, September 17, 1739, in Grieg, ed., Vol. I, pp. 32-33. 14 Letter 15, March 4 1740, Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 36-38
The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter; nor in his accurate dissections and portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body pretend to give his figures any graceful and engaging attitude or expression. There is even something hideous or at least minute in the views of things which he presents; and it is necessary the objects should be set more at a distance, and be more covered up from sight, to make them engaging to the eye and imagination. An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter, and it is even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the former. We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connection, before we can design with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to practical morality, and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations (T 3.3.6.6).
The same double analogy is presented a third time in the first section of the 1748
Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding-retitled An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding in 1758 -albeit now with the greater eloquence characteristic of Hume's later work:
An artist must be better qualified… who, besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects, but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or a Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colors of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs, he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body: the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other (EHU 1.8).
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Indeed, the entire first section of the first Enquiry, "On the Different Species of Philosophy," can be read as an elaboration of the analogical reasoning introduced almost a decade earlier. 16 "As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable," one species of authors "paint her in the most amiable colors, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence."
Such eloquent writers "make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments." Hume here indicates for the first time the precise techniques that painters can adopt to evoke moral sentiments in their readers, most notably their use of vivid examples. Painters of virtue, he explains, "select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples" (EHU 1.1). As is typical of pre-romantic aesthetics,
Hume sees the painter's art as essentially mimetic. Painters strive to recreate segments of reality as accurately as possible, and their success can be judged by a representation's ability to evoke the same sentiments which the objects depicted would evoke were they directly available to our observation. 17 "All polite letters," Hume insists, "are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set before us" (EHU
1.2).
Anatomists of morals, on the other hand, "regard human nature as a subject of speculation, and with a narrow scrutiny examine it in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action or behavior." Anatomists treat their examples as data for use in inductive reasoning rather than as valuable in themselves, "proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded."
17 The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, himself clearly a painter of morality, provides an helpful description of the goals of such painting along these pre-romantic lines. What is more, anatomists, unlike painters, do not attempt to reach a general audience. Since "their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labor of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity" (EHU 1.2).
If anatomists do happen to find some common readers, these readers may not only be …as those that study the anatomy of dead carcasses may see that the chief organs and nicest springs more immediately required to continue the motion of our machine are not hard bones, strong muscles and nerves, nor the smooth white skin that so beautifully covers them, but small trifling films and little pipes… so they that examine into the nature of man… may observe that what renders him a sociable animal, consists not in his desire of company, good nature, pity, affability, and other graces of a fair outside, but that his vilest and most hateful qualities are the most necessary accomplishments to fit him for the largest, and, according to the world, the happiest and most flourishing societies. 21 Hume does not want to disgust the reader of the Treatise in this way. To the contrary, he hopes that readers of his accurate anatomy of our moral sentiments will become convinced that "not only virtue must be approved of, but also the sense of virtue-and not only that sense, but also the principles from whence it is derived-so that nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good." At the conclusion of the Treatise, Hume observes that "were it proper in such a subject to bribe the readers assent, or employ anything but solid argument, we are here abundantly supplied with topics to engage the affections" (T 3.3.6.3). The implication, however, is that while Hume's moral anatomy could conceivably be framed to as to evoke reader's positive emotions, such affective "bribery" is not proper in philosophy. It would be easy for someone who has demonstrated the truth of an anti-Mandevillian anatomy of virtue to lure readers into a love of morality, but this would be rhetorical eloquence, not "solid argument," and hence precluded by the genre rules of the philosophical treatise.
Yet if engaging the affections to support the love of virtue were truly impermissible in a philosophical work, Hume could have easily refrained from doing so at all. The conclusion of the Initially this seems a plain denial of any hortatory intentions. But on the other hand it is also plainly an admission that he has just been engaged in recommending a virtue and painting its charms. Hume is being arch. He has not really caught himself in getting carried away; he is just imitating, as eighteenth-century prose stylists tended to do, the casual discontinuities, hesitations, afterthoughts and backpedallings of actual conversation. If his commendatory painting of benevolence were really a deviation from his intentions, he could easily have struck it out. The only reason for failing to revise his discussion of benevolence is that it did indeed reflect his intentions.
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The fact remains, of course, that Hume confines the explicit engagement of the reader's affections to the conclusion of the Treatise, and that the rest of the work fails to evoke significant emotional reactions. At the same time, however, it is the moral anatomy which dominated the work until this point that has "abundantly supplied" the material which is deployed in the conclusion to evoke warm engagement. If nothing else, this proves that moral anatomy can indeed be useful to the painter of virtue-the painter whom Hume himself becomes, however briefly, in the conclusion to the Treatise.
Hume did seem to think that a painterly approach might harm the reception of the Treatise. He suggested to Hutcheson that moments of warm rhetoric scattered across a work of cold, abstract reasoning would be seen as contrary to good taste. Yet why is so much abstract reasoning necessary in the first place? It must be because Hume essentially agreed with Locke that it was the only sure path to truth. The thrust of the first section of the first Enquiry is therefore not a value-neutral description of the two species of philosophy described, but an 22 apology for careful, abstract anatomy addressed to a readership Hume assumes to be favorably disposed only to painting. And if dry argument is indeed the path to truth generally, this truth is of the utmost importance when it comes to moral subjects "as may have a direct reference to action and society" (EHU 1.6).
If Hume's analogical reasoning holds correct, however, then they only way to prove that the beauty of virtue is more than skin deep is to flay it, hence destroying this very beauty.
Dissection, even of the most genuinely attractive human body, is an inherently grisly business.
As Swift noted, it will, in time, inevitably produce a stench. Hume is thus deeply concerned that The question is how to conduct an accurate anatomy of morality without dismembering our moral sentiments in the process. By the time of the first Enquiry, Hume has abandoned his insistence that painting and anatomy be kept separate. Now, he will instead attempt to "unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy" (EHU 1.17), though it is unclear precisely how this is to be accomplished. The literary technique adopted in the Treatise-apologetically appending a painterly conclusion to what is otherwise an essentially anatomical work-did not prove successful. This is not to say that the bulk of the Treatise was composed without belletristic goals in mind. Box describes Hume's literary intentions in his first work thusly:
Hume says here that an anatomist should not attempt to prettify the dissected object, but he does not say that the procedures of anatomy themselves cannot be more or less beautiful. Just as the dexterity and precision with which an anatomist wields his scalpel can be marvelous, the manner in which Hume philosophized could be too. Similarly an anatomist's lectures, and Hume's presentation of his findings, could be entertaining as well as instructive. Accordingly in the Treatise Hume did not try to beautify moral sentiments in order to recommend morality to his readers, but he did try to make the anatomizing of sentiment as marvelous for readers as he found it himself. 25 Hume, however, failed to achieve even this relatively modest literary goal. Rather than feeling wonder at his anatomical report, Hume's earliest readers felt at best indifference and confusion, at worst hostility towards an author they saw as seeking to undermine their moral London, and its conversational essays were widely imitated throughout Great Britain. 28 In the advertisement to the first, 1741 volume of his essays, Hume makes his debt to Addison explicit, explaining that his initial plan was to follow Addison's model in terms of both literary style and mode of initial publication: "Most of these essays were wrote with a view of being published as weekly papers, and were intended to comprehend the designs both of the Spectators and
Craftsmen. But having dropped the undertaking… before I ventured on to any more serious compositions, I was induced to commit these trifles to the judgment of the public." dissipate the sorrows of a heavy heart, or unbend the mind from its more severe employments with innocent amusements." 31 In his early essay "Of Essay Writing," which seems to have been intended as a mission statement for his aborted periodical, Hume celebrates the "league betwixt the learned and conversable worlds, which is so happily begun," and presents himself as an "ambassador from the dominions of learning to those of conversation." 32 In the name of all those of "sound understandings and delicate affections," the learned ambassador proposes an alliance against "our common enemies, against the enemies of reason and beauty, people of dull heads and cold hearts." 33 Far from a sacrifice on the part of philosophers in service to the multitudefar from a return from the light of reason to the darkness of Plato's cave-this alliance will actually help the learned better achieve their own goal, that of abstract truth. Hume's reasoning here is characteristically empiricist:
Learning has been a great loser by being shut up in colleges and cells, and secluded from the world and good company… Even philosophy went to wrack by this moping recluse method of study, and became as chimerical in her conclusions as she was unintelligible in her style and manner of delivery. And indeed, what could be expected from men who never consulted experience in any of their reasonings, or who never searched for that experience, where alone it is to be found, in common life and conversation?
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The main problem with this alliance, however, is that the learned are forced to leave their best weapons at the border of the conversable realm. Addison has never been admired as a great thinker, and the highly informal Addisonian essay is an inappropriate form for the communication of correct reasoning on difficult subjects, especially when compared to the success of the dry, Lockean treatise in this regard. Addison's work is, as Hume acknowledges, "trifling," and Hume in hindsight describes his own worst essays as giving "neither pleasure nor instruction," being merely "bad imitations of the agreeable trifling of Addison." 35 The most Addisonian and trifling of Hume's early essays-including "Of Essay Writing" itself-were excluded from later collections of Hume's writings. 36 Box gives a devastating account of the intentional "superficiality," the "utter emptiness of new or even rigorous thought," which characterizes these withdrawn pieces:
33 Ibid., p. 536. Hume's extended ambassadorial metaphor is problematically gendered-depicting women as the sovereigns of the kingdom of affection and conversation, while men are sovereigns of the realm of learning-in ways that relate in very complex ways with today's feminist critique of the opposition to emotion in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy. On this topic-in addition to Jacobson, ed., op cit.-see Lívia Guimarãs, "The Gallant and the Philosopher," Hume the Theory in print as "one of the most beautiful fabrics of moral theory, that has perhaps ever appeared." Such a work, Burke continues, must not be subject to the deformations of anatomical dissection. "A dry abstract of the system would convey no juster idea of it," he says, "than the skeleton of a departed beauty would of her form when she was alive; at the same time the work is so well methodized, the parts grow so naturally and gracefully out of each other, that it would be doing it equal injustice to show it by broken and detached pieces." 52 To be sure, we might dismiss this praise of Smith as the sort of hyperbolic flattery often exchanged by eighteenth century men of letters seeking to win one another's good graces. Even if Burke's praise of Smith is exaggerated, however, the anti-anatomical language used to formulate this praise is suggestive of the eighteenth-century literary ideals which Hume struggled so long to meet, and which he may never have succeeded in meeting to either his or others' satisfaction. 
